Дата публикации
Internet Freedom Kazakhstan (IFKZ) and the Eurasian Digital Foundation, in collaboration with the Open Observatory on Network Interference (OONI), conducted a study of Internet censorship in Kazakhstan for the period from June 2023 to June 2024.
The study revealed numerous cases of blocking news sites, human rights resources, and tools to circumvent blocking. The study is based on network measurement data and legal analysis conducted by IFKZ experts.
Key Findings
Blocking of news sites: The researchers recorded the blocking of 17 online publications, including Russian and Kyrgyz resources such as Kloop, Centralasia.media, and Vice News. These blockings are carried out through interference in TLS connections (MITM attacks), which are widely used in Kazakhstan.
MITM, or man-in-the-middle attack, is a type of cyber attack that secretly reads, intercepts, and modifies communications between two parties that believe they are communicating directly with each other.
The main types of man-in-the-middle attacks are network traffic interception (e.g., unencrypted Wi-Fi networks) and website or server spoofing (e.g., via fake certificates).
Blocking of human rights resources: Among others, the blocking of the Russian-language version of the Amnesty International website and petition sites such as change.org and ipetitions.com has been documented.
Use of censorship tools: Cases of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology being used to coordinate blocking of websites on 19 different networks in Kazakhstan have been documented, and the use of the latest root certificate of the NCA of the RK to carry out MITM attacks has also been documented.
Legal Analysis
The legal aspects of the study revealed a number of laws that allow government agencies to suspend access to Internet resources without a court order. In particular, the Law on Mass Media and the Law on Communications provide a legal basis for such blocking, which leads to restrictions on freedom of expression and access to information.
This section of the report analyzes both the content of regulations and their practical application, and also provides reservations about gaps in the law or overly broadly interpreted wording.
Here, IFKZ also provides an overview of publicly available data on the number of URLs and resources blocked by various government agencies, and the reasons for blocking.
Interviews
The researchers interviewed representatives of Kazakhstani media organizations ProTenge and Medianet, which have faced hacking and DDoS attacks on their resources.
The interviews are included in the report to highlight cases of restricting freedom of expression through cyberattacks and to highlight the importance of protecting digital rights.
OONI Technical Analysis and Conclusions
The Open Observatory found that most network restrictions are carried out through TLS interference and also documented the use of the government root certificate to conduct MITM attacks.
The report therefore provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of internet censorship in Kazakhstan, including statistics, case studies, real-life examples, as well as an analysis of legislation and its implementation.
The joint study by OONI, IFKZ and EDF will be a useful resource for human rights defenders, journalists, researchers and citizens interested in the state of freedom of speech and internet censorship in the country.
We thank the users of the OONI Probe application in Kazakhstan for collecting the measurements that allowed us to conduct this study.
You can read the full study in Russian and English at the link: https://ooni.org/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/
(translation is done automatically)
The study revealed numerous cases of blocking news sites, human rights resources, and tools to circumvent blocking. The study is based on network measurement data and legal analysis conducted by IFKZ experts.
Key Findings
Blocking of news sites: The researchers recorded the blocking of 17 online publications, including Russian and Kyrgyz resources such as Kloop, Centralasia.media, and Vice News. These blockings are carried out through interference in TLS connections (MITM attacks), which are widely used in Kazakhstan.
MITM, or man-in-the-middle attack, is a type of cyber attack that secretly reads, intercepts, and modifies communications between two parties that believe they are communicating directly with each other.
The main types of man-in-the-middle attacks are network traffic interception (e.g., unencrypted Wi-Fi networks) and website or server spoofing (e.g., via fake certificates).
Blocking of human rights resources: Among others, the blocking of the Russian-language version of the Amnesty International website and petition sites such as change.org and ipetitions.com has been documented.
Use of censorship tools: Cases of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology being used to coordinate blocking of websites on 19 different networks in Kazakhstan have been documented, and the use of the latest root certificate of the NCA of the RK to carry out MITM attacks has also been documented.
Legal Analysis
The legal aspects of the study revealed a number of laws that allow government agencies to suspend access to Internet resources without a court order. In particular, the Law on Mass Media and the Law on Communications provide a legal basis for such blocking, which leads to restrictions on freedom of expression and access to information.
This section of the report analyzes both the content of regulations and their practical application, and also provides reservations about gaps in the law or overly broadly interpreted wording.
Here, IFKZ also provides an overview of publicly available data on the number of URLs and resources blocked by various government agencies, and the reasons for blocking.
Interviews
The researchers interviewed representatives of Kazakhstani media organizations ProTenge and Medianet, which have faced hacking and DDoS attacks on their resources.
The interviews are included in the report to highlight cases of restricting freedom of expression through cyberattacks and to highlight the importance of protecting digital rights.
OONI Technical Analysis and Conclusions
The Open Observatory found that most network restrictions are carried out through TLS interference and also documented the use of the government root certificate to conduct MITM attacks.
The report therefore provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of internet censorship in Kazakhstan, including statistics, case studies, real-life examples, as well as an analysis of legislation and its implementation.
The joint study by OONI, IFKZ and EDF will be a useful resource for human rights defenders, journalists, researchers and citizens interested in the state of freedom of speech and internet censorship in the country.
We thank the users of the OONI Probe application in Kazakhstan for collecting the measurements that allowed us to conduct this study.
You can read the full study in Russian and English at the link: https://ooni.org/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/
(translation is done automatically)
